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Crosses and Culture:
State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the US and Europe
This article compares the recent jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court and the European Court
of Human Rights on the question of state-sponsored religious displays. Both tribunals insist that
states have a duty of religious “neutrality,” but each defines that term differently. For the Supreme
Court, neutrality means that government may not proselytize, even indirectly, or appear to favor a
particular church; neutrality may even mean that government must not endorse religion generally.
For the ECtHR, by contrast, neutrality means only that government must avoid active religious
indoctrination; the ECtHR allows government to give “preponderant visibility” to the symbols of
traditionally dominant churches. The different conceptions of neutrality reflect institutional and
cultural realities. In particular, the differences reflect what sociologists of religion describe as the
“American” and “European” religious models.

1. Introduction
It is, in Joseph Weiler’s words, “[t]he debate that won’t go away.” 1 In both the United
States and Europe, controversies continue to erupt over the legality of state-sponsored religious
displays. In April 2010, a fractured US Supreme Court decided Salazar v. Buono, 2 a case
discussing the constitutionality of a Latin cross on public land, the latest in a long line of
decisions addressing government’s ability to display religious symbols. 3 Across the Atlantic, less
than a year after Salazar in March 2011, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) decided Lautsi v. Italy, 4 a case concerning the legality, under the European
Convention on Human Rights (European Convention), of Italy’s practice of placing crucifixes in
public school classrooms. National courts in Europe had been struggling with similar issues for
more than a decade, and judging from the public and media attention Lautsi drew throughout
Joseph H.H. Weiler, “State and Nation; Church, Mosque and Synagogue—the trailer” (2010) 8 ICON 157, 157.
[2010] 130 SCt 1803.
3
In addition to Salazar, the cases are McCreary County v. ACLU [2005] 545 U.S. 844; Van Orden v. Perry [2005] 545
U.S. 677; Capitol Square Rev. and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette [1995] 515 U.S. 753; Allegheny County v. ACLU [1989] 492
U.S. 573; Lynch v. Donnelly [1984] 465 U.S. 668; Stone v. Graham [1980] 449 U.S. 39.
4
Lautsi v. Italy No. 30814/06, Judgment of 18 March 2011 (Grand Chamber).
1
2
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Europe – not just in Italy, where opinion widely supported the crucifix – people cared deeply
about the outcome.
The fact that cases like Salazar and Lautsi continue to arise reveals something important
about the state of religion at the start of the twenty-first century. Long past the point when it was
supposed to have disappeared as a public concern, religion remains a vital, even growing force.
Governments continue to place religious symbols in courtrooms, classrooms, city halls, and
parks. And citizens continue to consider such symbols worth a fight. Even in Western Europe,
perhaps the most secular place on the planet, millions of people object to removing religious
symbols from public places. Other millions consider such symbols an affront to pluralism and a
throwback to an unenlightened time. The key point is this: both in the US and Europe, religion’s
continuing influence means that cases like Salazar and Lautsi will recur. Indeed, because of
religious symbols’ peculiar power to elicit emotional responses – alternately to inspire, comfort,
or offend – we should expect such controversies to be passionate, prolonged, and persistent.
In this article, I compare the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the ECtHR on statesponsored religious displays and explain how, and why, they differ. For both tribunals, the law
on religious displays is a matter of themes, not rules. The main theme is neutrality. Both the
Supreme Court and the ECtHR emphasize that government must remain religiously neutral in
order to promote social harmony. Yet “neutrality” has different meanings for the two tribunals.
For the Supreme Court, neutrality means, at a minimum, that government may not proselytize, in
the sense of pressuring people to join a religion. Neutrality goes beyond that narrow conception,
however. The Justices have also indicated that government may not display symbols in a way
that suggests preference for a particular sect. Indeed, the Court sometimes says that government
may not endorse religion even generally, though the Court’s decisions do not consistently
2
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support that view. For the ECtHR, by contrast, neutrality means only that the state must avoid
proselytism, understood as active religious indoctrination – classroom catechism or prayers, for
example. Giving “preponderant visibility” 5 to the symbols of a particular sect does not qualify, to
say nothing of endorsing religion generally.
The different conceptions of neutrality reflect institutional and cultural realities.
Institutionally, the Supreme Court’s status as a constitutional court allows it to adopt a stricter
version of neutrality than the ECtHR, which must accommodate a variety of national churchstate arrangements, including establishments. Culturally, the Supreme Court’s conception of
neutrality reflects what sociologists of religion refer to as the American model, which sees
churches as voluntary associations that must compete in a free religious market. 6 The American
model rejects government expressions of support for particular churches as inappropriate market
distortions. By contrast, the ECtHR’s thinner conception of neutrality comports with the
European model, in which churches act, not as competing “firms,” but as “public utilities” that
provide a kind of religious infrastructure for the nation as a whole. 7 Although the European
model rejects outright state indoctrination, it accepts symbolic endorsements of the dominant
local church.
I develop these arguments in detail below. In part 2, I use Salazar as a vehicle for
exploring the three visions of neutrality that appear in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence: nonproselytism, non-sectarianism, and absolute neutrality. In part 3, I show how Lautsi reflects the
ECtHR’s thinner conception of neutrality as a non-indoctrination principle. In part 4, I

Lautsi (n 2) [71].
Roger Finke and Rodney Starke, The Churching of America, 1776-2005 (Rutgers 2005); John Micklethwait and
Adrian Wooldridge, God Is Back (Penguin 2009).
7
Grace Davie, The Sociology of Religion (2007) 86.
5
6
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demonstrate how the different visions of neutrality adopted by these tribunals reflect underlying
institutional and cultural factors, particularly the competing “American” and “European”
religious models. In part 5, I offer some brief reflections on the value of comparative studies like
the one I undertake here.
2. The Supreme Court and Religious Displays
A. Salazar v. Buono
For a case that has drawn so much attention, Salazar’s holding is actually rather narrow.
The district court in Salazar had determined that an eight-foot Latin cross erected as a war
memorial on federal land in the Mojave Desert violated the Establishment Clause 8 and ordered
its removal. Instead, the government conveyed the land, along with the cross, to a private
organization. When the district court ruled that the government had attempted to evade the
injunction, the government appealed. The scope of the injunction, therefore, not the underlying
constitutional issue, was the precise question before the Court, which reversed on a 5-4 vote. In
the course of considering the scope of the injunction, however, both the plurality opinion and the
principal dissent extensively discussed the legality of the cross itself. They disagreed both about
the cross’s constitutionality and the proper test for deciding the question.
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, which he wrote for himself and two other Justices,
strongly suggested that the cross was constitutional. 9 “Although” the cross was “certainly a
Christian symbol,” the government had not been trying to “‘proselytize.’” 10 Nor did display of

US. Const. Amend. 1 (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion”).
Two other Justices believed that plaintiff lacked standing and voted to reverse on that basis.
10
Salazar (n 1) 1816.
8
9
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the cross in this context indicate official approval of a specific sect. 11 The government had
simply attempted to honor America’s war dead in a culturally familiar way:
[A] Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs. It is a symbol often used
to honor … those whose heroic acts, noble contributions, and patient striving help secure
an honored place in history for this Nation and its people. Here, one Latin cross in the
desert evokes far more than religion. It evokes thousands of small crosses in foreign
fields marking the graves of Americans who fell in battles . . . whose tragedies are
compounded if the fallen are forgotten. 12
In a concurring opinion, Justice Alito argued that removing the cross, as the district court had
ordered, would have sent the message that government was not “neutral” with respect to religion,
but actually “hostile … and bent on eliminating … any trace of our country’s religious
heritage.” 13
The principal dissent in Salazar, written by Justice Stevens for himself and two other
Justices, scoffed at the idea that the cross was constitutional. 14 The proper test was not whether
government was proselytizing or even expressing a sectarian preference – although in this case,
Stevens wrote, government surely had done the latter. Rather, the test was whether government
had “endorsed” religion in any way. 15 Here, “any reasonable observer” would understand that
the display expressed favoritism not only for religion, but for Christianity in particular. 16

ibid 1818.
ibid 1820
13
ibid 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
14
Justice Breyer dissented separately, arguing it was not necessary to discuss the constitutional issue.
15
ibid 1832 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16
ibid.
11
12
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“Making a plain, unadorned Latin cross a war memorial does not make the cross secular,”
Stevens wrote. “It makes the war memorial sectarian.” 17
B. Neutrality: Three Conceptions
Salazar reflects the unsettled quality of the Supreme Court’s religious-display
jurisprudence. 18 The Justices have never committed to a single test in this area. Although some
scholars treat the endorsement test that Justice Stevens mentioned in Salazar as the operative
standard, 19 the Court has not always applied that test, or applied it consistently. Cases turn on
broad principles and specific facts; 20 the jurisprudence is one of themes, not rules. One important
theme is neutrality. “[O]fficial religious neutrality,” the Court has said, is a “central
Establishment Clause value” that promotes “‘tolerance,’” “‘liberty and social stability.’” 21 The
Justices have not always agreed on what neutrality requires, however. Three conceptions appear
in their decisions.
The first is neutrality as non-proselytism: government may not display symbols in a
manner that pressures citizens to convert or to join a particular religion. Justice Kennedy once
famously remarked that a city could not erect “a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall,” since
that action would represent “an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion,” 22
but essentially all the Justices accept this conception of neutrality. 23 One might think of the nonibid 1835.
For a helpful discussion, see Kent Greenawalt, 2 Religion and the Constitution (Princeton 2008) 74-90.
19
Noah Feldman, Divided by God (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2005) 212. Douglas Laycock writes that,
notwithstanding inconsistencies and exceptions, the endorsement test embodies the Court’s “formal doctrine.”
Douglas Laycock, ‘Substantive Neutrality Revisited’ (2007) 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 51, 69.
20
Marc O. DeGirolami, Tragedy and History: The Quality of Religious Liberty (Harvard University Press forthcoming
2012).
21
McCreary County (n. 3) 860.
22
Allegheny County (n. 3) 661.
23
Adam M. Samaha, ‘Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting Principles’ [2005] Sup. Ct. Rev.
135, 149.
17
18
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proselytism principle as a variation on the coercion test the Court has applied in other
Establishment Clause contexts. 24 Symbols cannot directly coerce anyone, of course; one can
always ignore them. But in certain contexts symbols can exert pressure to conform, and that
pressure might amount to a kind of indirect coercion. A cross on city hall would not force
viewers to do anything, for example, but its permanent, prominent display might unduly
influence citizens’ religious commitments.
The non-proselytism principle appears in Salazar’s plurality opinion, which asserted that
the government had not been attempting to proselytize when it erected the cross as a war
memorial. The principle also appears in Stone v. Graham, 25 the Court’s first religious-display
case, decided more than 30 years ago. In Stone, the Court struck down a Kentucky statute
requiring public schools to post copies of the Ten Commandments in every classroom, along
with small-print disclaimers referring to the Commandments’ “‘secular’” function “‘as the
fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States.’” 26
Notwithstanding the disclaimers, the Court worried about the effect the displays would have on
impressionable children. The displays, it believed, would “induce the schoolchildren to read,
meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments.” 27 To be sure, children could
simply ignore the displays, but subtle pressure would remain, since students would be
“confronted . . . every day,” in every classroom, by an officially-sponsored religious text. 28

Lee v. Weisman [1992] 505 US 577.
Stone n 3.
26
ibid 41.
27
ibid 42.
28
Van Orden (n 3) 691.
24
25
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The second conception of neutrality to appear in the Court’s decisions is neutrality as
non-sectarianism. 29 This conception bars displays that favor or appear to favor a particular sect,
even if the displays avoid proselytism as such. Here, too, the Justices have been essentially
unanimous, at least as a matter of principle. Justice Scalia has written that the American
“constitutional tradition” forbids “sectarian” endorsements, that is, those that “specify[] details
upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the
world are known to differ (for example, the divinity of Christ).” 30 Of course, “sectarian” is a
contestable term, and the Justices have disagreed whether particular displays fall within the
category. Justice Scalia has argued that generally monotheistic references qualify as nonsectarian – the Ten Commandments, for example, which Christians, Jews, and Muslims all
accept. 31 Other Justices, by contrast, maintain that even generally monotheistic displays are
“sectarian” in that they implicitly reject polytheistic and non-theistic traditions. 32
The cases suggest that context can give an otherwise sectarian display a neutral, cultural
meaning. The Salazar plurality, recall, asserted that, as a war memorial, a Latin cross was not a
sectarian symbol but an acceptable cultural reference evoking the memory of America’s fallen
soldiers. The two crèche cases, Lynch v. Donnelly, 33 and Allegheny County v. ACLU, 34 provide
further examples. In Lynch, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a crèche in a city’s annual
Christmas display. Notwithstanding the crèche’s depiction of “an event that lies at the heart of

For arguments in favor of the nonsectarianism principle, see Michael W. McConnell, ‘Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads’ (1992) 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 156; Steven D. Smith, ‘Nonestablishment “Under God”? The Nonsectarian
Principle’ (2005) 50 Villanova L. Rev. 1.
30
Lee (n 24) 641.
31
McCreary (n 3) 894.
32
Van Orden (n 3) 719.
33
Lynch (n 3).
34
Allegheny County (n 3).
29

8
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Christian faith,” 35 the Court maintained that the display was essentially cultural. The city was
commemorating a national holiday with its traditional symbols; any sectarian meaning was
“indirect, remote, and incidental.” 36 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence echoed this point.
Christmas had its “religious aspects,” she conceded, but was also a “public holiday” with
“cultural significance.” 37 The city had displayed the crèche alongside secular holiday symbols
like reindeer and candy-striped poles, 38 thus ensuring that observers would understand that the
city had commemorated Christmas’s cultural, rather than sectarian, importance.
Allegheny County involved two public displays, a crèche with a banner reading “‘Gloria
in Excelsis Deo!’” and a composite display containing a Christmas tree, a Chanukah menorah,
and a sign saluting liberty. The Court held that the first display violated the Establishment Clause
but not the second. Unlike the crèche in Lynch, the Court explained, the crèche in Allegheny
County stood alone; no secular images “detract[ed] from [its] religious message.” 39 The display
thus went beyond “acknowledg[ing] Christmas as a cultural phenomenon” and endorsed the
holiday’s religious content. 40 With respect to the composite display, no single analysis
commanded a majority of the Court. For the two swing votes, the fact that the display contained
the holiday symbols of two religions, as well as a secular salute-to-liberty sign, helped lead to the
conclusion that the display was cultural rather than sectarian. 41

Lynch (n 3), 711 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
ibid 683.
37
ibid 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
38
ibid 671.
39
Allegheny County (n. 3) 598.
40
ibid 601.
41
Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, ‘The Cross at College: Accommodation and Acknowledgement of Religion at
Public Universities’ (2008) 16 William & Mary Bill of Rts. J 939, 991. On the importance of the multiple symbols, see
Allegheny County (n 3) 614-16 (Blackmun, J.), 626 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
35
36
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The third conception of neutrality is what one might call an “absolutist” position. 42 Not
only must government avoid proselytizing or expressing preference for a particular sect;
government must also refrain from displays that promote or appear to promote religion generally.
As between religion and non-religion, government cannot appear to “take sides.” 43 The
endorsement test embodies this version of neutrality. Unlike the first two conceptions, on which
the Justices agree in principle, the absolutist position remains controversial on the Court and in
the academy, 44 and the endorsement test faces uncertain prospects now that its chief proponent,
Justice O’Connor, has retired. 45 Notably, in Salazar, only the dissent relied on the endorsement
test; 46 the Justices in the plurality referred to it only in passing, for sake of argument. 47 The
controversy arises from the fact that the test casts doubt on many traditional and widespread
American practices. Public expressions of a generally religious nature abound in American life
and always have. To give just two examples, the National Motto, inscribed on all US currency, is
“In God We Trust,” and the Great Seal of the United States includes the eye of Providence and
the words “Annuit Cœptis,” or, in the official translation, “He (God) has favored our
undertakings.” 48 If one took seriously the admonition against generic religious displays, the
Motto, the Seal, and other similar expressions would have to go, unless one were willing to
“grandfather” them as a kind of ceremonial deism. 49

Lynch (n 3), 678.
McCreary (n 3) 860.
44
For a summary of criticisms of the endorsement test, see Jay D. Wexler, ‘The Endorsement Court’ (2006) 21
Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 263, 271-77. Wexler thinks many of the criticisms are overstated. ibid. 305.
45
Samaha (n 23), 137.
46
Salazar (n 2), 1832 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47
ibid 1819 (plurality), 1824 (Alito, J.).
48
US Dept of State, The Great Seal of the United States (2003) 15.
49
Andrew Koppelman, ‘The New American Civil Religion: Lessons for Italy’ (2010) 41 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 861,
864.
42
43
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In sum, for the Supreme Court, neutrality means that government may not display
religious symbols in a manner that proselytizes, even indirectly, or that demonstrates approval
for particular sects; some cases suggest that displays may not suggest approval for religion
generally, but that is more controversial. By contrast, as I explain below, the ECtHR has a much
narrower conception of neutrality. For that tribunal, neutrality means only that the state may not
proselytize, in the sense of engaging in active religious indoctrination. Displays of sectarian
symbols, even displays that give “preponderant visibility” to the symbols of the dominant local
church, are permissible.
3. The ECtHR and Religious Displays
A. Lautsi v. Italy
Lautsi’s facts are well known, so I will only sketch them here. 50 Italian regulations, often
characterized as fascist-era decrees but actually originating earlier, from the time of the
Risorgimento, require public elementary school classrooms to display crucifixes. Soile Lautsi,
the mother of two schoolchildren, challenged the regulations in the Italian administrative courts,
arguing that the crucifixes violated the constitutional doctrine of laicità, or secularism. 51 The
administrative courts rejected her challenge on the somewhat dubious ground that the crucifix
represented not Christianity but secularism. The lower administrative court maintained that
Christianity, understood correctly, contained within itself “‘those ideas of tolerance, equality and
liberty which form the basis of the modern secular State, and ... the Italian State in particular.’” 52

For an interesting recent discussion of Lautsi, see Javier Martínez-Torrón, ‘The (Un)Protection of Individual
Religious Identity in the Strasbourg Case Law’ [2012] OJLR 1, 21-22.
51
The Italian Constitutional Court declined jurisdiction, as the challenge involved administrative regulations rather
than statutory provisions. Susanna Mancini ‘Taking Secularism (not too) Seriously: the Italian “Crucifix” Case’
(2006) 1 RHR 179, 183.
52
Lautsi (n 4) [15].
50
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The crucifix thus stood for Italian constitutional values, including laicità. On appeal, the
Consiglio di Stato affirmed. Although it avoided the lower court’s more questionable forays into
theology, it agreed that the crucifix represented civic values, such as tolerance and freedom of
conscience, which happened to have a Christian origin. 53
Lautsi then sued Italy in the ECtHR, arguing that the crucifixes violated article 2 of the
First Protocol to the Convention, which provides that “[i]n the exercise of any functions which it
assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to
ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical
convictions,” 54 and article 9 of the Convention, which confers the right “to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion.” 55 In a brief opinion, a chamber of the court agreed. Together, the
chamber held, articles 2 and 9 imposed on states a duty of religious “neutrality and impartiality”
that prohibited proselytism. 56 Public schools must not be places of “missionary activities;” 57
government must “refrain from imposing beliefs, even indirectly,” on impressionable
schoolchildren. 58 Here, the chamber reasoned, the presence of crucifix could indeed create
pressure for students; even though students need not take any action in response, the crucifix was
a powerful, permanent symbol they could not ignore. The chamber dismissed Italy’s argument
that the crucifix represented “neutral,” secular values: whatever other meanings might exist, the
sectarian message was obviously “predominant.” 59

ibid [16].
Lautsi v. Italy [2009], No. 30814/06 (Judgment of 3 Nov. 2009) [27].
55
ibid
56
ibid [47]. The ECtHR’s jurisprudence refers to the duty as one of “neutrality and impartiality,” but I refer to it in
the text as a duty of “neutrality,” for consistency’s sake.
57
ibid
58
ibid [48].
59
ibid [51].
53
54
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The chamber’s reasoning thus closely tracked the Supreme Court’s analysis in Stone, the
classroom Ten Commandments case, which also focused on the potential of passive displays to
proselytize schoolchildren. 60 The chamber’s decision also comported with the most famous
European religious-display case before Lautsi, the Classroom Crucifix II Case, 61 in which the
German Federal Constitutional Court held that a similar classroom crucifix requirement violated
the duty of neutrality under the German Basic Law, also because of the danger of indirect
proselytism. 62 When Italy referred the chamber’s decision in Lautsi to the Grand Chamber, then,
most observers expected that the GC, too, would hold that displaying the crucifix violated the
state’s duty of neutrality.
In the end, however, the GC rejected the chamber’s analysis and held that displaying the
crucifix did not violate Italy’s duty of neutrality. The GC began by noting the “diversity of
practice” in the Council of Europe regarding religious symbols in public schools: 63 a few states
prohibited such symbols; a few, like Italy, expressly required them; and several allowed them
without specific authorization. 64 National courts that had considered the legality of such symbols
under domestic law had reached inconsistent results. 65 Given the diversity of practice, the GC
argued, states must have a wide “margin of appreciation” in determining, with respect to public

Stone (n 3).
[1995] 93 BVerfGe 1. For a translation, see Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal
Republic of Germany (Duke University Press, 2nd ed., 1997) 472.
62
For a helpful discussion of this case, see Gerhard Robbers, Religion and Law in Germany (Kluwer 2010) [637][638].
63
Lautsi (n 4) [61]
64
ibid [27].
65
ibid [28]. Swiss, German, and Spanish courts had ruled against such displays, but Polish and Romanian courts had
allowed them.
60
61
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religious displays, how best to apply the duty of neutrality in light of local circumstances and
traditions. 66 Italy, the GC believed, had not exceeded that margin.
Like the chamber, the GC understood neutrality as a non-proselytism principle. It
conceived of proselytism more narrowly, however. The GC conceded that display of the crucifix
gave “preponderant visibility” to the symbol of Italy’s “majority religion.” But “indoctrination,”
not “preponderant visibility,” was test, and indoctrination meant something more than placing an
“essentially passive” symbol on a wall. 67 The GC emphasized that teachers had no obligation to
incorporate the crucifix into their class instruction; indeed, as far as the record revealed, no
teacher had ever referred to the crucifix in a “proselytizing” manner. 68 Moreover, other
circumstances minimized the danger of indoctrination. Italian schools allowed minority students
to wear their religious attire to class and often celebrated minority religious holidays like
Ramadan; schools also provided optional religious instruction for students from minority
religions. 69 Finally, the GC said, Ms. Lautsi always could guide her children outside school in
conformity with her own convictions. 70
The GC demurred with respect to Italy’s argument that the crucifix represented neutral,
cultural values as well as sectarian ones – that Italy’s history gave the crucifix an “identitylinked” meaning that justified its display. 71 Although the administrative courts had endorsed that

ibid. [61], [70]-[76]. For criticisms of the role the “margin of appreciation” doctrine played in the GC’s decision,
see Paolo Ronchi, ‘Crucifixes, Margin of Appreciation and Consensus: The Grand Chamber Ruling in Lautsi v. Italy’
(2011) 13 Ecc. LJ 287; Lorenzo Zucca, ‘Lautsi – A Commentary of the Grand Chamber decision’ (2011) 11
(manuscript on SSRN, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809577).
67
Lautsi (n 4) [72].
68
ibid [74].
69
ibid. For criticism of this section of the GC’s opinion, see Claudia E. Haupt, ‘Transnational Nonestablishment’ 80
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (SSRN manuscript at 33-34).
70
Lautsi (n 4) [75].
71
ibid [67].
66
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argument in Lautsi, Italian courts were in fact somewhat divided, and the GC did not wish to
interpose itself. 72 In other words, even assuming the crucifix was a sectarian symbol, the GC
believed that Italy was acting within its margin of appreciation in continuing its traditional,
pervasive classroom display – always provided Italy did not cross the line of indoctrination. 73
B. Neutrality as Non-Indoctrination
In defining neutrality in terms of a duty to avoid religious indoctrination, Lautsi follows a
line of ECtHR cases, dating back to 1976, on the duty of religious neutrality in public
education. 74 The GC relied on two in particular, Folgerø v. Norway and Zengin v. Turkey. 75
Folgerø concerned a mandatory class, “Christianity, Religion, and Philosophy,” that Norway
offered in its public schools. 76 Among other things, the class attempted to impart to students
“‘thorough knowledge of the Bible and Christianity in the form of cultural heritage and the
Evangelical Lutheran Faith;’” to educate students about other religions; and to “‘promote …
respect for Christian and humanist values.’” 77 The class description implied that teachers could
lead students in “‘religious activities” like prayers, scripture readings, and religious plays, 78

ibid [68].
As Malcolm Evans writes, under the GC’s approach, “[t]he State can be ‘neutral and impartial’ whilst
‘perpetuating’ the traditional place of religions in the public life of the country.” Malcolm D. Evans, ‘Lautsi v. Italy:
An Initial Appraisal’ (2011) 6 Religion and Hum. Rts. 237, 243.
74
The first case was Kjeldsen v. Denmark [1976]. For a helpful discussion of the duty of religious neutrality in the
ECtHR, see Malcolm D. Evans, From Cartoons to Crucifixes: Current Controversies Concerning the Freedom of
Religion and the Freedom of Expression before the European Court of Human Rights (2010-2011) 26 JLR 345.
75
Lautsi (n 4) [71]-[74].
76
Folgerø v. Norway No. 15472/02, Judgment of 29 June 2007) (Grand Chamber0 [3]. For a recent discussion of
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although parents could ask that the school excuse their children from activities the parents
believed to be “‘the practice of another religion or adherence to another philosophy of life.’” 79
The ECtHR held that the class violated the duty of neutrality. In principle, schools could
offer a class in comparative religion, and the emphasis on Lutheran Christianity did not pose a
difficulty, given the place of that religion in Norway’s “history and tradition.” 80 The problem
arose from the requirement that the class “promote respect” for Christian values, and, especially,
the possibility that teachers would conduct Christian exercises in class. These exercises could
affect impressionable schoolchildren in a manner that Article 2 prohibited – that is, they could
amount to indoctrination by the school. 81 Although parents could request that their children be
excused from religious exercises, parents might well decline to do so, since requesting an
exemption might reveal “intimate aspects of [the parents’] own religious and philosophical
convictions.” 82
Zengin also concerned instruction in comparative religion. Turkey required public school
students to take classes in “‘religious culture and ethics.’” 83 The classes were supposed to
comply with “principles of secularism and freedom of thought, religion and conscience” and
“transmit knowledge concerning all of the major religions” in a spirit of tolerance. 84 In fact,
however, they actively inculcated the doctrines of Sunni Islam. For example, teachers were
required to demonstrate that, “‘far from being a myth, Islam [was] a rational and universal
religion’” and to impress upon students the value of worship that showed “‘love, respect and
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gratitude towards Allah.’” 85 Students received instruction in Sunni rites, prayers, and holidays
and had to memorize chapters from the Koran. 86
A parent belonging to the Alevi faith, a branch of Islam that differs from the Sunni form,
sued Turkey, arguing that the class violated his article 2 rights. The ECtHR agreed. As in
Folgerø, the difficulty was not that public schools offered comparative religion classes or that
the syllabus emphasized Sunni Islam, which was, after all, Turkey’s majority religion. 87 The
problem was that schools were not teaching the classes in an objective and pluralistic way. 88
Once again, there existed a real threat of indoctrination. Teaching students that Islam is “a
rational and universal religion,” and requiring them to study Islamic prayers and memorize
chapters from the Koran, obviously lent itself to active proselytism. Moreover, even though
Alevis made up a “very large” proportion of the Turkish population, 89 the classes conveyed little
information about Alevism; this inattention showed disrespect for the religious convictions of
Alevi parents like plaintiff. 90 Finally, unlike Christian and Jewish students, whose parents could
request they be exempted from the classes, Alevi students were required to attend. Even with
respect to Christians and Jews, the court noted, the opt-out was problematic, since, as in Folgerø,
parents might well be reluctant to reveal their religions publicly. 91
Cases like Folgerø, Zengin and of course Lautsi itself do not even hint at the nonsectarian or absolutist versions of neutrality that appear in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
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For the ECtHR, neutrality means simply the absence of active religious indoctrination,
understood as classroom religious exercises, assignments that require students to memorize
religious texts, and lessons that endorse the truth of religious doctrine. As long as public schools
refrain from such activities, they avoid engaging in proselytism and comply with the duty of
neutrality. Once one understands this rather narrow conception of neutrality, Lautsi’s holding
about the “essentially passive” display of crucifixes in public school classrooms – a pervasive,
sectarian display if ever there was one – is completely comprehensible. The interesting question
is why the ECtHR’s conception of neutrality is so thin in comparison with the Supreme Court’s.
I turn to that question next.
4. Institutional and Cultural Realities
A. Institutional Factors
To explain the different conceptions of neutrality, one must look to institutional and
cultural factors. Institutionally, the Supreme Court’s position differs dramatically from the
ECtHR’s. The Supreme Court has formal appellate jurisdiction in a unified constitutional system.
Its judgments bind lower courts, state and federal, as a matter of law. Moreover, the American
Constitution contains an anti-establishment clause that applies to the states as well as the federal
government. 92 Thus, the Supreme Court can plausibly seek to fashion a uniform, comparatively
rigorous national standard regarding public religious displays. This does not mean that the
Court’s efforts are completely consistent or successful. The fact that so many similar cases about
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religious displays appear on the Court’s docket year after year, and the fact that the Court has
had such difficulty reaching consensus about them, indicate the complexity of the task.
The Supreme Court is much better positioned to attempt such a task than the ECtHR,
however. The ECtHR is not a constitutional court, 93 but a supranational tribunal without formal
appellate authority over domestic courts. Over time, in a process international-law scholars have
studied extensively, domestic courts in Europe have come to accept the ECtHR’s judgments and
conform their jurisprudence to its interpretations of the Convention. 94 If the ECtHR were to
“move[] too far out of line with a prevailing domestic democratic consensus,” however, domestic
authorities, including courts, might simply decline to “follow.” 95 Moreover, the Convention does
not have an anti-establishment provision, nor could it, given the variety of church-state
arrangements in the Council of Europe. With regard to state-sponsored religious displays, in
particular, a consensus does not exist.
An attempt to fashion a uniform, rigorous neutrality requirement thus would be neither
legitimate nor feasible for the ECtHR. Given the diversity of state practice, the ECtHR can only
announce a minimum standard and leave the rest to countries’ “margin of appreciation.”
Consider the likely result if the ECtHR had adopted the approach of the chamber in Lautsi – the
same approach, recall, as the American Supreme Court in Stone and the German Federal
Constitutional Court in Classroom Crucifix II – and announced a more rigorous neutrality
requirement forbidding display of the crucifix. The crucifix had overwhelming support in Italy;
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according to some polls, 84% of Italians favored its presence in public schools. 96 Political
leaders “from the President of the Republic to the Prime Minister” had vied with each other to
defend it. 97 Twenty European countries, almost half the membership of the Council of Europe,
had expressed public support for Italy; 98 ten had intervened at the GC in favor of Italy’s
position. 99 In these circumstances, Italians would likely have seen a ruling against the crucifix as
illegitimate and found a way to subvert it, whatever the GC held. 100
B. The American Religious Model
Institutional explanations only go so far, however. To account fully for the divergent
meanings of neutrality, one must look to differences in underlying religious culture. Recent
literature in the sociology of religion addresses these differences. America and Europe are
complex societies, of course, and one must avoid oversimplification. Nonetheless, sociologists
speak in terms of American and European religious models, and some generalizations are
possible. 101 The American model treats religion as a market. It sees churches as voluntary,
private associations that compete for members, much in the way businesses compete for
customers. Success depends on satisfying consumer demand; churches rise or fall based upon
their ability to attract and retain adherents. As with any market, government provides public
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goods that make “commerce” possible, for example, infrastructure, security, and the rule of law.
In fact, in the American model, government can promote religion generally as a public good,
much as governments everywhere try to foster favorable business environments. But government
cannot promote or protect particular churches. 102 Favoritism would create perverse incentives,
making beneficiaries lazy and unresponsive to the wishes of the faithful. Preferential treatment
for particular churches, in other words, would distort the religious market in a way that would
ultimately injure religious consumers.
The American model reflects historical and intellectual origins, what Tocqueville would
have called America’s “point of departure.” 103 Most British colonies in North America had
established churches, defined by law and supported by tax assessments. For example, the Church
of England was established in Virginia and the other Southern colonies, as well as New York;
the Congregational Church was established in New England. 104 But conditions made
establishments difficult to maintain. 105 In a frontier society with a deracinated and transient
population, people found it relatively easy to evade ecclesiastical discipline. One could simply
relocate, as Roger Williams famously did when he ran into trouble with church authorities in
Massachusetts. 106 The religious movements that succeeded were those that adapted to the new
conditions and offered less institutionalized, more egalitarian forms of religion that depended not
on ties to established bodies but voluntary commitment from the faithful. Itinerant preachers like
George Whitefield, for example, whose tours of America in the 1740s drew huge crowds and
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sparked the First Great Awakening, succeeded precisely because they appealed to a mobile,
hardscrabble population that valued straightforward, emotional preaching over intellectual
sermons and church formality. 107
After independence, although some states continued to have established churches for a
time, an opposite trend formed. The Establishment Clause prohibited establishments at the
federal level, of course. Even for states that wished to maintain establishments, the task became
increasingly difficult as the population spread beyond the eastern seaboard. Once again, the
churches that succeeded were those that adapted to the egalitarianism of the frontier, like the
Baptist and Methodist Churches, whose polities were “surprisingly democratic,” even compared
with Congregationalists. 108 These churches drew clergy principally from the local populations
they served, not from eastern seminaries, an important factor in attracting and retaining
members. In Finke and Stark’s phrase, “Baptist and Methodist preachers looked like ordinary
people because they were, and their sermons could convert and convince ordinary people
because the message was direct and clear and the words were not read from notes.” 109 Revival
meetings, for which Methodists, in particular, became famous, combined church services with
huge picnics that “provided the ideal religious and social solution to the isolated circumstances
of American farmers.” 110 In short, Baptists and Methodists succeeded because they identified a
new market and devised ways to attract and retain enthusiastic followings.
The American model did not result simply from geography, however. Ideology played a
major role as well. As George Marsden writes, a “peculiar … alliance” between evangelical
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Protestantism and Enlightenment rationalism has informed American religious culture from the
start. 111 Evangelical Protestantism stressed the importance of personal conversion and individual
conscience. Salvation, it argued, required a genuine commitment from the believer, a voluntary,
unreserved response to God’s gift. Evangelicals understood the church as an association of
people who had made this commitment – the saved – not as an institution that civil authority
maintained. 112 Indeed, they argued, civil authority inevitably corrupted the church by offering
worldly inducements and encouraging people to believe they could achieve salvation through
formal membership in an official body. State churches, with elaborate rituals and hierarchies,
tended to substitute human tradition for the Bible, which, to the evangelical mind, was
humanity’s only reliable authority. “The common person who stood by the plain, common sense
meaning of the Bible,” they believed, “could confidently disregard the authority of educated
clergy or prestigious churches.” 113
Evangelicalism thus opposed establishment. Opposition also came from Enlightenment
rationalism. Many of the founding generation – Jefferson and Franklin, for example – were
Deists who had “abandoned those parts of the Christian heritage that they thought were not based
on reason.” 114 Like evangelicals, they rejected restraints on individual conscience. They did so
not because they thought an unrestricted conscience would lead inevitably to Christ, but because
they believed that conscience, left to itself, would inevitably conform to reason. By prescribing
forms of worship and belief, and, even worse, by preserving irrational superstitions, established
churches interfered with conscience and prevented reason’s ultimate triumph. Moreover,
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rationalists associated establishments with political repression. Established churches, like the
Anglican Church during the American Revolution, inevitably supported traditional authority and
opposed liberty. 115
Evangelical Protestantism and Enlightenment rationalism thus made common cause in
the battle against establishment in the early Republic. 116 Jefferson sent his famous letter extolling
the separation of church and state to Baptists in Connecticut. 117 Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments in Virginia provides another example. 118 In 1784,
Patrick Henry introduced a bill in the Virginia legislature that would have assessed a tax to
supplement the salaries of Christian ministers. 119 Opposing the bill, Madison blended evangelical
and Enlightenment rhetoric. He argued on theological grounds that religion “must be left to the
conviction and conscience of every man” and that Christianity did not need establishment to
succeed. In fact, establishment historically had corrupted Christianity, resulting in “pride and
indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and
persecution.” 120 Madison also made a political argument: establishment corrupted civil
government. “[I]n many instances,” established churches “have been seen upholding the thrones
of political tyranny; in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the liberties of the
people.” 121 Establishments inevitably opposed civil equality and “just government.” 122
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By the 1830s, establishments had ended in America. 123 In addition, a consensus formed
that government could not act in ways that suggested preference for particular sects. As Michael
McConnell explains, the idea that government must not favor one sect over another appears
“repeatedly in both statements and constitutional enactments of the founding period.” 124 The
nonsectarianism principle came up mainly in the context of government’s provision of material
benefits to religion, but the principle covered public religious expressions as well. 125 Indeed,
public religious expressions in the early Republic – Thanksgiving proclamations, congressional
statements, presidential addresses – almost invariably spoke of God or Providence rather than
Christ. 126 This reticence comports with the broader nonsectarianism that Tocqueville found so
remarkable in American politics. Americans, he observed, believed that religion was “necessary
to the maintenance of republican institutions,” but denominational differences did not overly
concern them. 127 “In the United States,” he wrote, “when a political man attacks a sect, it is not a
reason for the partisans even of that sect not to support him; but if he attacks all sects together,
each flees him and he remains alone.” 128
To be sure, in an overwhelmingly Protestant society, listeners could easily interpret vague
expressions about “God” and “Providence” as Christian references, and most Americans surely
did. Most simply assumed that “nonsectarian” meant generically Protestant, which explains how
so many could oppose “sectarian” influence in public education but nonetheless support
classroom Bible readings that inculcated a Protestant understanding of scripture, 129 and why
Massachusetts was the last state to end establishment, in 1833.
Michael W. McConnell, ‘Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision’ (1990) 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1130.
125
McConnell (n 29), 157.
126
McCreary (n 3), 897-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Laura Underkuffler-Freund, ‘The Separation of the Religious and
the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory’ (1995) 36 William & Mary L. Rev. 837, 954.
127
Democracy in America (n 103) 280.
128
ibid.
129
For an excellent discussion, see Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Harvard 2002) 219-29.
123
124

25

Draft (Not for Citation)—Published Version at 1 Oxford J.L. & Relig. 338 (2012)

politicians “informally continued to speak of the nation as though it were a Christian nation, or at
least a biblical nation.” 130 People rarely perceive their own ironies, and Protestantism so
pervaded nineteenth-century America that few apparently noticed the inconsistencies. 131 Some
thought nonsectarianism did not go far enough; Jefferson, for example, declined to issue
Thanksgiving proclamations as president because he thought government should avoid all
implication of religious belief and practice, even purely hortatory statements. 132 But the frequent
public, nonsectarian expressions in the early Republic suggest most Americans thought
government could promote religion generally.
I lack space to detail how the early Republic’s understanding of church-state relations has
ramified through history. The market model certainly captures the situation in America today. In
Micklethwait and Wooldridge’s phrase, “[t]he American religious marketplace is almost a study
in perfect competition: there are no real barriers to entry, the domestic market is big enough to
support a mind-boggling variety of religious producers, and new religious entrepreneurs are
always rising up to challenge incumbents.” 133 On the “demand side,” Americans increasingly see
religion as a matter of personal choice. 134 Although most have “the same religious identity as
their parents,” 135 political scientists Putnam and Campbell estimate that “at least one third” of
contemporary Americans have chosen “their religion rather than simply inheriting it,” and that
the percentage is increasing. 136 About 25% have “shopped around” for a new place of worship at
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least once, not counting those who have looked because of a move. 137 Religious “brand loyalty”
is “surprisingly low.” 138
Similarly, Americans tend to see churches not as traditional institutions into which one is
born but as voluntary associations of like-minded persons. 139 Thus the congregation, “an allpurpose association with members who choose it, belong to it, and make contributions to it” is
the “most prevalent form” of religious association in America today. 140 This is not surprising
with respect to Protestants, since the congregation is the quintessential Protestant polity. But
non-Protestant and even non-Christian groups also adopt the form. For example, Alan Wolfe
observes that American mosques operate as Protestant-style congregations. They have members
who support them through voluntary contributions and who elect committees and officers to run
them. 141 They sponsor Sunday schools and social activities.142 Members expect imams to act as
“professional clergy” and handle day-to-day management responsibilities. 143 None of this is
typical in predominately Muslim societies, where mosques are “convenient places” to pray rather
than religious organizations. 144 American Hindus and Buddhists similarly adopt the
congregational form. 145
On the supply side, religious bodies compete fiercely to attract and retain adherents. 146
Just as Baptists and Methodists shaped their messages to appeal to the egalitarianism of the
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American frontier, today’s “pastorpreneurs” focus on the “‘total service excellence’” that
American consumers expect. 147 One of the most important phenomena in contemporary
American religion is the megachurch – defined as a church with at least 3000 weekly attendees –
which offers multiple worship services and opportunities for charity work, as well as amenities
like banks, basketball courts, child care, coffee shops, pharmacies, even martial arts classes. 148
Thousands of such churches exist. 149 Adaptability, innovation, and niche marketing are crucial;
megachurches often have services directed at specific affinity groups. 150 Indeed, whole
denominations have sprung up to appeal to particular demographics. 151 The variety is staggering.
The Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches for 2011 lists roughly 200 Christian bodies
alone in the United States, from the Catholic Church, with roughly 70 million members, to the
Pentecostal Fire-Baptized Holiness Church, with roughly 200. 152
Finally, although Americans continue to oppose state favoritism for particular sects, they
remain very comfortable with public support for religion in general. As Putnam and Campbell
observe, “rather than a wedge pushing Americans apart, public expressions of religion often
serve to pull them together.” 153 Two hundred years after the founding, public “appeals to God at
times of national unity are still de rigueur.” 154 Only recently, for example, the House of
Representatives voted, by a margin of 396 to 9, to reaffirm “In God We Trust” as the National
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Motto. 155 Americans support such expressions because they believe, overwhelmingly, that
religion plays a positive role in society. In recent surveys, large majorities even of secular
Americans agreed that religion has had a good influence in American life. 156 Only a small
segment of the most secular Americans expressed discomfort with religion’s role. 157 Moreover,
a large majority of Americans, about 80%, say they value religious diversity and think it has
benefitted the country, 158 and almost 90% believe that followers of other religions own can go to
Heaven. 159 Given these broadly ecumenical attitudes, it is not surprising that Americans
overwhelmingly support what they conceive as inclusive, nonsectarian public expressions.
The Supreme Court’s religious-display jurisprudence comports with the market model.
Forbidding displays that proselytize or suggest preference for particular sects ensures that
government does not interfere with the market by attempting to identify winners and losers.
Nonsectarian displays that promote religion generally as a public good do not pose the same
threat of market distortion, by contrast, and the Court allows them. To be sure, the endorsement
test’s prohibition of nonsectarian displays goes further than the market model would require.
Perhaps, as others have written, this aspect of the Court’s jurisprudence reflects the fact that
Justices and their clerks tend to come from the more secular elements of American society and
fail, in this respect, to reflect consensus American values. 160 In any event, as I have explained,
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the Justices do not rigorously or consistently apply the endorsement test and indeed may be
poised to abandon it.
C. The European Religious Model
The European situation differs substantially. As in America, religion in Europe is a
complicated phenomenon. Variations exist among and within nations; one must avoid accepting
surface realities. Even in secular France, for example, government has more ties to religion than
simplistic accounts of laïcité would suggest. 161 Nonetheless, one can make some generalizations
and speak meaningfully of a European religious model. That model assumes a “dominant”
territorial church as “the ‘normal’ form of religious organization.” 162 Where the American model
treats churches (plural) as voluntary associations that compete for members, the European
perceives the church (singular) as a traditional, state-supported institution whose membership
comprises society as a whole. 163 One does not join a church, as in the American model; one is
born into the dominant local church and remains there unless one takes steps to leave. 164 The
church performs social functions like weddings and funerals and hosts significant national and
community events. Most people will require its services at some point in their lives and simply
assume it will be there for them when they need it, whether or not they are active supporters;
indeed, whether or not they are practicing Christians. 165 As Grace Davie writes, in European
societies, churches – particular churches, not religion in general, as in the American model – are
“public utilities” that maintain a kind of religious infrastructure for the nation as a whole. 166
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Like the American, the European model reflects historical origins. European history has
ensured that national and sectarian identities intertwine in a way Americans find difficult to
grasp. 167 For many European states, especially those that formed during the second great wave of
Christianization at the start of the last millennium, conversion served as “the founding event of
[the] nation.” 168 For example, the late French historian René Rémond writes, national
consciousness in Denmark and Norway began with the baptism of Scandinavian monarchs
around 1000 years ago; Hungary, Poland, and Russia similarly trace their origins as nations to
royal conversions around the same time. 169 European nations traditionally do not identify with
“Christianity in general,” however. As a consequence of centuries of inter-Christian conflict,
different churches predominate in different countries.
For example, the Great Schism of 1054 split Europe into a Catholic West and an
Orthodox East, a division that remains salient today, especially on the borders. In the West
during the Reformation, national identities formed around Catholicism or Protestantism, and,
within Protestantism, around particular forms. So, for example, Austrian and Spanish identity
crystallized around loyalty to Catholicism and resistance to Protestant rebels like the Czechs,
Dutch, and northern Germans; the same could be said, in reverse, for the rebels themselves. 170
British identity became strongly Protestant under the Tudors; within Britain, Calvinist Scotland
distanced itself from Anglican England. This is not to say religious differences created national
identities, only that religious differences had a very important role in the formation of national
self-images across Europe. The Westphalian settlement, and, in particular, the principle of cuius
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regio, eius religio, strengthened the link between national identity and religion. 171 By allowing
rulers to determine the religion of their territories and excluding outside interference, the
principle solidified national religious identities as of the mid-seventeenth century.
Westphalia also strengthened official ties between church and state. The state church, an
official monopoly that suppressed competitors and coerced conformity by law, became the norm
both in Catholic countries, like France and Spain, and Protestant countries, like Britain, the
Netherlands, and Sweden. 172 Indeed, state and church formed particularly strong links in
Protestant polities – the Lutheran principalities of Germany, for example – where the state
appointed clergy, abolished independent church courts, and generally assumed responsibility for
church government. 173 In short, in Europe, the traditional form of religion was that which
America rejected from the start.
Over the last two centuries, in a process too complicated to describe here, European
nations have departed from the historical pattern of the confessional state, even if some, like
Britain, have maintained mild establishments. The historical experience continues to resonate,
however. To be sure, no European country today enforces religious conformity by law. Nowhere
do civil rights depend on religious affiliation; legal equality exists everywhere and people are
free to worship or not as they choose. In these important ways, religious neutrality indeed obtains
in Europe. As Grace Davie observes, however, the legacy of national religious identities and
state churches means that equality for faith traditions, as a cultural matter, cannot exist. 174
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Throughout Europe, historically dominant churches, even those churches that have been
officially disestablished, continue to exert disproportionate social influence.
Italy itself provides a good example. As I have explained, the doctrine of laicità renders
Italy a “non-confessional secular State.” 175 The Italian Constitution provides that “[t]he State and
the Catholic Church are independent and sovereign, each within its own sphere,” 176 and that
“religious denominations are equally free before the law.” 177 Yet the Catholic Church has
privileges other sects lack. In Italy, bilateral agreements govern relations between the state and
religious organizations, including the Catholic Church. The Concordat with the Catholic Church,
however, has a higher status in Italian law than the analogous agreements, called intese, which
the state has with non-Catholic organizations. 178 Some religious bodies have not been able to
secure intese at all, making their situation even less advantageous. 179 Moreover, the Concordat
gives the Catholic Church preferential treatment. For example, Italian public schools must offer
classes in Catholicism at public expense; local bishops select the instructors. 180 Non-Catholic
groups with intese can offer religious education in public schools, if students or parents request
it, but these groups must pay the teachers themselves. 181 Catholic marriages (and annulments)
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have essentially automatic civil effect; non-Catholic religious marriages do not. 182 Other
examples exist as well. 183
One could hardly argue for the neutrality of these preferences in an abstract sense. Given
the dominant role of Catholicism in Italian society, however, one can explain them. As a state,
Italy is fairly young, having come into existence only in the mid-nineteenth century. Attempts to
promote a republican consciousness have not greatly succeeded. Catholicism has served as the
integrating force in society, from the founding to the present. During the Risorgimento,
Alessandro Ferrari writes, Catholicism “was the only cement binding the new country together: a
country without a common language and without a widespread culture capable of founding civic
engagement.” 184 Catholicism continues to provide a sense of cohesion in contemporary Italy,
where roughly 90% of the population identifies as Catholic. 185 In fact, Catholicism provides a
kind of background norm that gives content to legal doctrines like laicità. 186 In Silvio Ferrari’s
phrase, Catholicism provides Italy’s “civil religion,” the set of overarching cultural values to
which everyone implicitly assents. 187
The fact that Catholicism has a dominant place in Italian culture does not mean that
Italians are markedly pious on a personal level. In fact, only about 30% of Italians attend Mass
regularly. 188 And Italians are among the more observant people in Europe. By comparison, only
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five percent of French attend religious services on a weekly basis; 189 in Sweden, the number is
more like two percent. 190 Taken as a whole, the percentage of Europeans who say that religion is
important to them is low. “Overall, only 21 percent of Europeans say that God plays an
important role in their lives, compared with 60 percent of Americans (and 90 percent in many
Muslim countries).” 191 In terms of personal commitment, Europe is indeed a rather secular place.
Paradoxically, though, this secularism at the personal level is consistent with the
dominant influence of traditional churches at the collective level. Two concepts from the
sociology of religion, “belonging without believing” and “vicarious religion,” help explain
why. 192 Even if they do not practice their religion, large numbers of Europeans continue to
maintain formal affiliation with traditional churches. For example, despite the fact that
Scandinavians attend church very rarely and report very low levels of personal belief, an
“extraordinarily high” number have their children baptized. 193 In Germany, to give another
example, the state collects a “church tax,” equal to about eight percent of the taxpayer’s income
tax liability, which the state directs to the church the taxpayer designates. 194 All the taxpayer
must do to avoid the tax, which might amount to a significant sum, is to declare that he is
“religiously unaffiliated.” 195 Notwithstanding the low rate of religious observance in Germany –
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less than 10% attend religious services weekly 196 – most people, at least in the west, continue to
declare affiliation with their churches. 197 They opt to belong, even if they do not believe.
Why would people who do not believe continue to maintain an affiliation with the
traditional church? Some might believe the church has an important role in educating children. 198
Some might value the moral cohesion the church promotes. 199 Some might see the church as a
vehicle for preserving continuity with the nation’s past. 200 And some might retain their affiliation
simply out of inertia. The important point is this: belonging is the default position that apparently
few people wish to alter, even if they no longer have a personal commitment, or only a very
weak one. For a great many people, formal affiliation with the traditional church is simply part of
what it means to be a member of the national community.
The second concept, “vicarious religion,” is associated principally with Grace Davie. 201
The term describes a situation in which the majority of society expects that “an active minority”
will maintain the traditional church in its behalf – perform liturgies, celebrate marriages, repair
sanctuaries, and so on. 202 The majority is not indifferent; indeed, it believes the church has an
important social role. 203 The majority simply expects other people, presumably at state expense,
to maintain the church so that it will be available when the majority needs it. For example, Davie
notes, even though Europeans do not attend church regularly, they often protest when church
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buildings in their communities close. 204 The buildings make up an important part of the local
landscape to which people feel they have a right. Similarly, Europeans often resent being asked
for entry fees at church buildings “on the grounds that such buildings, particularly those that
belong to the historic churches, are … public rather than private space, to which everyone
(believer or not) should have the right of access.” 205 The church buildings, in other words,
belong to society as a whole, not “exclusively to those who use them regularly.” 206
Funerals provide perhaps the best illustration of both “belonging without believing” and
“vicarious religion.” Notwithstanding the widespread availability of secular funerals, not many
Europeans choose to have them. 207 Most Europeans would not think of anything other than a
religious funeral, and they expect the church to perform this service for them when they die,
whether or not they have been believers while alive. For example, when British foreign minister
Robin Cook died in 2005, his funeral took place in the Church of Scotland, even though he was
an avowed atheist. This was appropriate, the officiating minister explained, apparently without
irony, because Cook had been a “Presbyterian atheist.” 208 When François Mitterand, the very
laïc French President, died in 1996, the Catholic Church gave him not one funeral Mass, but
two. 209 When a gunman massacred 93 people at a youth camp in Norway in 2011, a national
memorial service took place in Oslo’s Lutheran Cathedral, attended by the royal family, the
prime minister, and large numbers of Norwegians from around the country. 210
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The ECtHR’s conception of neutrality comports with the European religious model. Acts
of state indoctrination, such as holding religious exercises in public school classrooms and
requiring students to memorize scriptural passages, obviously create pressure for individuals to
conform to official religious orthodoxy, and the ECtHR forbids them. On the other hand, the
ECtHR allows government to display symbols of the dominant local church in a manner that one
can only see as an endorsement – to give such symbols “preponderant visibility,” in the ECtHR’s
words – even where impressionable schoolchildren are involved. In a model that assumes the
existence of a historically rooted, state-supported church with which the nation strongly
identifies, if principally as a cultural matter, and into which the majority of people are born and
expect to die, a more rigorous definition of neutrality would be incongruous. American-style
nonsectarianism would not fit, to say nothing of the endorsement test’s prohibition of even
generic religious references.
To be sure, some observers argue that the European model is changing. Increasingly, they
say, Europe is becoming an American-style religious marketplace in which membership in a
dominant local church is no longer a given. 211 Unsurprisingly, the churches that do best in the
“new” religious “economy” are those that adopt American ways. 212 For example, Pentecostalism,
a Protestant movement born in America in the last century, has experienced remarkable growth
in Europe in the last generation. 213 American megachurches see Europe as mission territory; their
European church “plants” evangelize in a very American fashion. For French scholar Olivier
Roy, the emergence of the new religious market in Europe reflects the “deculturation” of religion
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that is occurring around the world. 214 “[T]he good old days,” he writes, “when religion was
embedded in culture and culture imbued with religion,” are gone. 215 “[C]ulturally religious nonbelievers” in the European style “are vanishing”; 216 around the world today, religion is a function
of personal seeking and self-definition, not national or cultural identity.
If European religion really is moving toward the American market model, the ECtHR
may ultimately shift toward a more American understanding of neutrality as well. Reasons exist,
however, to think that the historical link between religion and culture in European society will
only grow stronger in coming years. As increasing numbers of Muslims immigrate to Europe,
they seem to be causing resurgence in Christian identity among their neighbors. For example, in
surveys, “the percentage of white Britons who call themselves ‘Christian’ (rather than ‘no
religion’) is considerably higher” in “neighborhoods with high Muslim populations” than in
“similar, less mixed neighborhoods, even after one reckons in income and other complicating
factors.” 217 The rise in Christian identification probably does not reflect an increase in personal
piety, however. Sociologist Martin Riesbrodt notes that Europeans who reengage with
Christianity seek principally to revive the “‘dominant Christian culture.’” 218 “If this ‘dominant’
culture then wanted to tell them how they should spend their Sundays or how they should behave
in the bedroom,” he says, they “would quickly lose their enthusiasm.” 219 Most likely, these re-
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Christianized Europeans are “simply professing a tribal allegiance to Team Christianity,” 220
rather than choosing religion in an individualized, American way.
5. Conclusion
My purpose in this article has been comparative and critical: I have attempted to explain
different legal regimes in terms of fundamental institutional and cultural commitments.
Comparative work, particularly interdisciplinary comparative work, is still a bit new in law and
religion scholarship. As Grace Davie recently has written, law and sociology ask different
questions and rely on different methods; “conversations” between lawyers and sociologists can
therefore be “difficult.” 221 Nonetheless, such conversations are essential. 222 For law both reflects
and influences underlying social conditions. In Mary Ann Glendon’s phrase, “law, in addition to
all the other things it does, tells stories about the culture that helped to shape it and which in turn
it helps to shape: stories about who we are, where we came from, and where we are going.” 223
The law on state-sponsored religious displays reveals very different understandings about the
place of religion in American and European society. This article is an effort to illuminate those
understandings and contribute to an emerging path in law and religion scholarship.
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